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The following are the principal points of the committee's recommendations:

It is desirable that the government legislate a law which removes all doubt regarding the authority to instruct the IDF. The committee stresses that the authority specified in the defense service law permitting the defense minister to mobilize reserves is not transferable.

Regarding the conclusions of the two earlier reports, the committee made one amendment regarding the mobilization of the reserves on the eve of the war. It rules now that it should have been said that Prime Minister Golda Meir decided to mobilize the reserves in accordance with the advice of the then Chief of Staff David El'azar, and later the government approved that.

In the personal sphere the committee cancels its earlier recommendation to suspend Maj Gen Shemu'el Gonen from every duty in the IDF. However, it says that he cannot assume a multi-formational command duty or a corresponding duty in the general staff.

Concerning the differences in opinion in which Maj General Ari'el Sharon was involved during the war regarding the question of discipline, the committee rules that it accepts his view that there are certain exceptional incidents in which a field commander is allowed not to carry out a command from above and account for that later.

Regarding other subjects the committee found defects in the emergency stores, in the help extended by the intelligence in the early days of the war, and in the control over the situation shown by commanders and the corps under their command.

Finally, Reserve Lt Gen Hayyim Iaskov prepared a special chapter connected with the drawing of conclusions regarding the training in the IDF.

Chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee Yizhaq Naron, who received the full report this evening along with the prime minister, expressed a preliminary reaction in which he says: The present report is mainly technical and deals with purely military aspects. The Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee will follow up the implementation of the recommendations and will pay attention to the remark regarding the need to define exactly the division of the jurisdiction among the prime minister, the defense minister and the chief of staff.

Knesset member Yizhaq Navon said in this connection that at the end of last week his committee heard from the prime minister how the recommendations which were included in the first report of the Agranat Committee had been implemented, especially in the intelligence sphere. The committee obtained the impression that most of these recommendations have been implemented and the rest are in the process of implementation.

Knesset member Begin said that in its final report the committee actually rules that the political sector caused the disaster of the Yom Kippur war. This sector should therefore behave modestly in the future. Mr Begin expressed satisfaction that the committee refuted the claims that reserve Maj Gen Ari'el Sharon had violated military discipline.

Mr Sharon pointed out this evening that the Agranat Committee accepted his stand regarding the question of discipline. On the other hand, he is not sure that the 8 October events were investigated fully.

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SPIEGEL: So what do you mean?

Goldmann: The great Zionist ideologist Ahah Haam said: What we need is a cultural, ideological center, not a state. The Maccabeans did not save Israel, despite all the respect I have for them. The plain Talmudist Yohanan Ben Sakcai saved Israel. When the Jews were expelled, he went to the Roman emperor asking for a Talmud school in Javne. He got it. This secured the existence of the Jewish people in the 2000 years of their scattering. Heine once said that the Jew with his Talmud and tradition had a "portable fatherland," and when he was expelled from France to Germany, for instance, he took his portable fatherland along.

SPIEGEL: This is no more necessary today.

Goldmann: I think today the Jewish people can only outlast together with the State of Israel. But only with an Israel that is not another Lebanon--I do not want to insult Lebanon--or another Holland, but a state trying to implement Jewish prophetic ideas.

SPIEGEL: If you make such big demands to Israel, you must be very disappointed. Because aside from Jewish traditions, the State of Israel today is a state like every other state.

Goldmann: On the one hand I am satisfied by the great and extraordinary achievements of the young state. But on the other hand I am disappointed. The best Zionists are disappointed. Ben Gurion was disappointed and Golda Meir is disappointed, too.

SPIEGEL: You are writing in your autobiography that Zionism is one of the most irrational ideas of history. It certainly succeeded in one of the most adventurous establishments of a state in modern times. But it did not succeed in even half-way solving the most important problem of this state--its relationship with the Arabs. Do you fear the idea could have been too irrational?

Goldmann: Every revolutionary idea is at least partly irrational such as Marxism and Zionism. But Zionism did not want to come to an end with the establishment of a state. I am convinced it still has a long way to go, and an absolute raison d'etre if it is tackling the much more difficult problem after the establishment of a state: Making this state an outstanding Jewish state.

~~SPIEGEL: Mr. Goldmann, we thank you for this talk.~~

REPORTAGE ON AGRANAT COMMISSION'S OCTOBER WAR INQUIRY

Commission Releases Report

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1900 GMT 30 Jan 75 TA

[Text] The full report of the Agranat Committee, some 1,600 pages, was submitted this evening in two copies to the prime minister and to the chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. Parallel to that a 40-page summary of the report was released to the public. The summary contains the principal points of the report in the sections that are not classified.

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Conclusions of Inquiry Reported

Jerusalem International Service in English 2045 GMT 30 Jan 75 ID

[Text] The Agranat Commission of inquiry into the Yom Kippur war has submitted its final report to Prime Minister Yizhaq Rabin. The commission deals particularly with the first 3 crucial days of the war. It says that on the southern front the surprise was absolute, while in the north it was less so because the army had been reinforced there before the war.

The commission has scathing words for field intelligence, which, it says, almost didn't operate, and it criticizes the enslavement of intelligence to preconceptions. The level of army preparedness in the north was fairly high, and although the forces on the Golan were surprised by the extent and timing of the Syrian attack, they were able to fight back well.

On the southern front the story was different, and Major General Shemu'el Gonen, the first commander, is given much of the blame. During the critical first counterattack by the Israel Army, the commission says that Gonen failed to visit the front to see what was happening, or maintain an effective communication system. It praises his personal courage but does not see him as fit for a regional command. In view of the situation at the front on that day, the commission sympathizes with the dilemma which led Maj Gen Ari'el Sharon to disobey orders by Gonen.

The commission notes that the ultimate test, however, on all fronts was the army's ability to seize the initiative after the bad start, and to face unforeseen situations. This task the army met brilliantly.

Press Critical of Agranat Report

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0500 GMT 31 Jan 75 TA

[Morning press review]

[Excerpt] Most of this morning's papers express great disappointment over the small part of the Agranat Commission report that was released for publication last night, the reason being that it neither gives us a clear picture, nor reflects properly the full report of the commission. The papers do not conceal their criticism of the fact that the released part of the commission's report has no answer to the many questions bothering us since the Yom Kippur war about the responsibility of public figures for what happened before and during the war.

DAVAR contends that the released part of the report deals only in a general way and by hints to the basic issues of the responsibility for the shortcomings and in the descriptions of shortcomings themselves. For this reason, the commission's final report is not likely to generate the same stormy upheaval generated by the partial report that was published in April last year. It appears that also the distance in time that had passed since the war has had its due effect, so that the final report did not produce the excitement that had been expected. DAVAR claims that the communications media reserve the right to criticize the commission's conclusions, including the unsatisfactory formulation of the definition of those cases in which it is permissible to disobey orders in the IDF. The final conclusion is that there is still the necessity for a close study of the commission's final report.

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HA'AREZ asserts in the headline of the editorial that what has been released for publication is a miserly reporting of the commission's report, concealing most of that commission's work. That's why the paper is not happy about what has been published. HA'AREZ thinks that the damage to security that would have been caused by publishing most parts of the report would be smaller than the public damage caused by avoiding the publication. The paper does not find in the released extracts of the commission's report an answer to the crucial question of what had caused the imbalance that drew us at a certain moment into dangerous straits. It also cannot be learned from what has been published, whether the issues of the array of forces, the armaments, the stocks of ammunition and the manning of posts of command at various levels came under the treatment in the full report. The paper is also still bothered by the question of whether the mishaps and failures during the first days of war were an unavoidable consequence of then circumstances, or whether the army could have been possibly more successful despite the shortcomings caused by a hasty call up of the reserves. HA'AREZ's conclusion is that by hiding most of its work from the nation's eyes the commission forfeited the educational influence its report should have had.

The Jerusalem POST notes that the layman is in difficulty in comprehending the published part of the commission's final report, except for the conclusion that an army can be no better than the populace from which its soldiers are conscripted. It can be learned from the report that lack of discipline, the failure to pay attention to small details, disrespect of the law and lack of personal example are liable to erode the fighting capability of even the best army.

AL HAMISHMAR voices disappointment over the commission having issued a document that practically exonerates former Defense Minister Moshe Dayan of every guilt, while it puts actually the principal responsibility for the blunders on the former chief of staff, Lt Gen David El'azar. The paper wonders why the commission did not see fit to refer in more detail to the public and political aspects of its findings. The paper complains that members of the commission cast fog over the issue of the defense minister's authority, without referring to the fact that no chief of staff had issued operational instructions without the defense minister's prior approval. AL HAMISHMAR does not adopt the commission's assertion that lack of discipline during the war was, as it were, a phenomenon characteristic with our fighters and commanders. The paper also frets at the commission having completely cleared Ari'el Sharon who had disobeyed his commander's orders, and even bragged about it. This clearance stands in blatant contradiction to the commission's demand to strengthen discipline in the IDF. The paper asks whether as of now every commander will be allowed to determine what the rare case is--as formulated by the commission--in which he may disobey an order.

HAZOF learns from the commission's conclusions that there is a necessity to define most precisely the authorities of the prime minister, the defense minister, the chief of staff and of the entire government in the vital subjects of security.

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POST Discusses Agranat Report

Jerusalem POST in English 31 Jan 75 p 1 TA

[By David Landau]

[Text] The effects of lax discipline and a weakening in military good order, the inefficiency of the military intelligence units who operated under rigid--and fallacious--preconceptions, the inadequacy of the Southern Front commander who did not possess the qualities required of a battlefield leader--all these elements, combined with the shock of the Yom Kippur attack, contributed to the Israel Defence Forces' early failures in the war. They are searchingly and meticulously analysed by the Agranat Commission on the war in its third and final report, a 1,512-page document submitted to the Cabinet and to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee yesterday.

Only 43 pages of the report were made public--mostly of a general and unspecific nature. The committee's numerous and detailed findings and recommendations remain by-and-large classified although the committee strongly advises that large sections of its report be made mandatory reading for IDF officers in their bases.

The committee delivers a harsh verdict against Aluf Shemu'el [Major General] Gonen, commander of the southern front during the war, and recommends that he not be entrusted with combined land forces or any parallel command on the general staff. The committee also rejects Aluf Gonen's various complaints and allegations of fraud and forgery in the submission of vital evidence to it. The complaints were "irrelevant," the commission says, and the allegations against Aluf Avraham Adan, a divisional commander and on the southern front during the war, are dismissed as without foundation.

The commission vindicates Aluf (Res) Ariel Sharon's controversial and much criticized concept of military discipline. It pronounces its agreement with Aluf Sharon's view that certain, extreme battle conditions can justify an officer ignoring or disobeying an order. Aluf Sharon presented his viewpoint in a newspaper interview last January, and the committee, which questioned him at length on it, finds that it is "consistent with the tenets of military discipline."

The incident in question, when Aluf Sharon wished to disobey an order (but eventually carried it out) occurred towards the end of the war, not during the battles of October 8, on which the committee concentrated in the main.

The committee stresses that it did not see as part of its task a critical consideration of the overall "political and strategic" decisions involved in the war. The basic "war aims" and the principles of any particular battleplan were accepted "as the data on the basis of which we went ahead to examine the actual management of the battles."

There is no specific mention--in the published section--of then-Defence Minister Moshe Dayan's role in the defensive stage of the war, under review in this third report. The committee discusses briefly, and academically, the legal lacunae which make for a lack of clearly defined areas of responsibility between the Cabinet, the defence minister, and the general staff in time of war, but emphasizes that the defence minister is not a super-chief of staff, nor responsible for battlefield action. New and more specific legislation is required, the committee urges, but it makes no recommendations of its own.

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Launching into a lengthy discussion of discipline in the army, the committee notes that this has become subject to well-meaning words and intentions rather than to the actions so urgently required. The committee cites--only to firmly reject--the opinion of one senior officer, that investigating the war's failures and suggesting disciplinary remedies are not "the central issue facing the IDF", and that it is the restoration of the confidence in the army which is the "central issue".

The committee sees the two as indivisible. It stresses, too, the indivisibility of pedestrian, day-to-day discipline--in dress and appearance, in bodily cleanliness and cleanliness of weapons and equipment, in driving and behavior on the road, and in the myriad other aspects of ordinary army life--and the performance of an army in the supreme test of war.

The "spirit of self-sacrifice and ability to improvise to a large extent saved the IDF from catastrophe--but these are no substitute for discipline."

There can be no delay in correcting the disciplinary lapses within the army, the committee says. The effort must be made simultaneously with the ongoing effort to build up the army and strengthen its military might.

Shortcomings that are prevalent in civilian life have begun to taint the army, the committee warns. But the IDF, even though it is essentially a citizen army, can rise above the shortcomings of society around it--and thereby help to eventually redress those very shortcomings.

The committee praises the morale and spirit which infuse the IDF, and expresses its confidence that these qualities, together with a revitalized sense of discipline, will stand it in good stead in tests that may lie ahead.

Explaining its decision to concentrate on the October 8 battle in the south, and the October 7-8 battle in the north, the committee says that its primary task was to point up weaknesses so that the IDF can learn from its mistakes and prevent their recurrence. The "defensive stage"--which the committee was called upon to investigate--in fact continued in the south until October 14, when Israel crossed the canal--but the crucial battle of October 8 on the canal's central sector highlighted, in the committee's view, the crucial weaknesses and failures.

At the same time, the October 8 attack was the IDF's first "self-initiated" action of the war--as distinct from the initial desperate battles of October 6 and 7 which were reflex holding actions rather than planned military moves.

The October 8 battle occupies 746 pages of the committee's report. In the section made public, the committee stresses Southern Command's "lack of control over the progress of the battle and its failure to read the military moves as they took place." This caused what then-Chief of Staff Elazar had called an "eroding deviation" in the battle aims--a phrase that the committee endorses.

Actions and decisions taken by various commanders during that fateful battle stemmed from the pre-war preconceptions rather than from a pragmatic assessment of the actual situation.

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Southern Front Commander Shemu'el Gonen, whose meteoric rise through the ranks the committee traces in detail, lacked the ability to direct a coordinated action by forces of multi-divisional strength. He had been a brave and gifted field commander-- "but not every brave commander able to command a brigade is equipped to coordinate the action of a multi-divisional army. There was a contradiction between Gonen's course of promotions and his effectiveness as commander of the Southern Front, before and at the start of the war."

The committee lists Gonen's failures in the October 8 battle, he "did not prepare for the battle in a sufficiently systematic way; he did not prepare detailed plans of operations; he did not ensure that his campaign orders reached his unit commanders; he did not check that his forces had gathered and had been deployed properly in advance of the action; he did not ask to see his subordinate commanders' plans and therefore did not approve them; once the battle had begun, he directed it without effective means of control or effective staff work; he refrained from taking personal command of his troops and thereby failed to register a first-hand impression of the battle's progress; he took crucial decisions regarding the movement of divisions hastily and without ascertaining that all the aims had indeed been achieved; he repeatedly changed the divisions' objectives and gave them new objectives without supplying his forces with updated information on the enemy's forces....."

The committee implies that other commanders involved in the October 8 battle were also not blameless. It does not pass judgment, but notes that it has recommended army investigations into various aspects of the day's events. But it "found no basis, on our part, for recommending the retirement of other officers."

Despite the setbacks and casualties suffered during the October 8 battle, the committee points out that the IDF action was not a total failure. While the Egyptians were not driven back across the water, their bridgeheads were contained and their advance checked. Alufi Sharon's division was able to advance within sight of the canal on the next day (October 9)--and that advance, by revealing the weak link in the Egyptian defences, eventually paved the way for the successful canal crossing a week later.

The committee is scathing in its review of military intelligence's role in the fateful battle. It recalls its earlier criticism of intelligence for the immediate pre-war misreading of the situation--which itself formed "the background of the October 8 battle." Field intelligence, it continues, hardly operated at all during the first days of the war, and the intelligence effort in general was afflicted by the same "subservience to preconceived models" which had caused its pre-war failure.

There is a caferul examination of the state of the IDF's emergency stores on the eve of the war--but virtually all of this remains classified. The committee notes the many complaints which it received from reserve soldiers who found their equipment malfunctioning or inadequate.

In the north, the IDF was far better prepared for the war, although the strength and determination of the Syrian onslaught still threw it initially off balance. The committee spent 311 pages examining the fight for the Golan on Oct. 7-8.

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It found mistakes--but these, it says, did not stem from negligence but rather from wrong assessments of the enemy's intentions. The committee praises the resilience of the Northern Command and the speed with which it was able to move from defence to successful attack.

The committee also expresses its praise and admiration for the bravery and self-sacrifice of the officers and men who served on both fronts during the crucial first days of the Yom Kippur war.

IDF REPORTS EGYPTIAN FORCES MOVEMENT IN CANAL AREA

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1000 GMT 29 Jan 75 TA

[Text] Our military correspondent Roni Daniyyel reports that the reinforcement of the Egyptian forces across the canal is continuing. The movement to reinforce the Egyptian Army started at the end of last week, and since then units of limited size have moved from the Egyptian heartland to the canal area. Our correspondent says that during this limited reinforcement no Egyptian forces have crossed to the eastern bank of the Suez Canal, and the Egyptian Army continues to honor the disengagement agreement.

The IDF is watching these movements, and senior quarters told our correspondent this morning that they still consider the movements as insignificant. The IDF forces in the limited forces zone are maintaining a normal way of life while watching developments.

IDF Denies Shelling Lebanon

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 2000 GMT 30 Jan 75 TA

[Text] Correspondents report from Beirut that a state committee representing the Lebanese Government intends to visit Kafr Shuba and the Fatahland to survey the damage caused by the IDF shelling and attacks. For this purpose, the correspondents adds, Lebanon has asked through the Red Cross for a 5-day cease-fire.

In reaction to this, authoritative circles told our correspondent that since the IDF operations in Kafr Shuba area about a week ago there has been no shooting in the area, and consequently there is no need to declare a cease-fire. These sources also told our correspondent that the Lebanese have asked Israel a number of times to avoid shooting at certain hours so that civilians can enter evacuated villages and take out movable property, and that each time it was made clear to the Lebanese that the IDF was not shelling and hence there was no need to agree to avoid shelling.

IDF Shells 'Fatahland'

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 31 Jan p 1 TA

[By DAVAR military correspondent]

[Text] After a respite that lasted about 2 weeks in the sector bordering on the Fatahland, IDF forces yesterday fired a number of artillery shells at terrorists in the area of the Lebanese village of Halta in the southern part of the Fatahland.